In 1954 Herbert Morrison said that a ‘minister is responsible for every stamp stuck on every envelope’ in their department. Using examples, critically discuss whether the above statement is accurate today

IntroductionHerbert Morrisons comments represent an ideal of attendial Responsibility which his semipolitical heirs and descendants hand over, in truth, aband stard to a large degree. In blow up this reflects new political realities and a change in the behaviour of politicians who endeavor to protect various(prenominal) reputation at the expense of what was once a sacred principle of Government1. The righteousness to which Herbert Morrison entirelyudes to arises often in the context of when a curate should resign which has undergone some marked transformations over the years as the apparatus of Whitehall has exploded and powers make water been invested in individual parsons non- segmental bodies, public corporations and different agencies such as quangos2 now complement ever growing departments. As Diane Longley & Norman Lewis observe the roots of the principle stretch far behind before Morrisons time to the days of Dicey where the liability to passage of office was e xtended to all official acts3 which invariably covered departmental maladministration to more sound matters. The principle, as a means of holding the executive branch of the government to composition, has been justifiably described as hollow, a ruling fiction 4 and leading constitutional scholars have called for purify in this argona as far back as the year 20005. compensate back in 1956 prof finer cast doubt upon its genuinely existence in the wake of the Crichel polish affair6. No such reform or replacement has ever arrived, however, and despite nonable episodes such as the Hutton inquiry, the cash for questions probes and the recent expenses scandal in Westminster no alternative surmise or principle has surfaced7. The operation of the principle has also been seen as non aiding government accountability just now hindering it by mevery commentators umpteen students of public administration, including the authors, have long taken the view that subgenus Pastorial certifica te of indebtedness/accountability (M.R.) as the ruling chemical formula for calling the executive to account is hollow. Indeed, operating at its to the highest degree pernicious, it is a system for the mutually-reinforcing active screen of government action and public purposes.8This search will focus on whether the principle of ministerial responsibility, as described by Herbert Morrison, is still veracious in the political temper of 2012. In part 1 this essay will look into the Crichel Down affair of 1937 to establish the supposed assembly and then in part 2 the Scott Report, which was commissioned after it emerged that Britain had interchange arms to Iraq, will be analysed. The inescapable conclusion is that Morrisons description reflects a nobler and purer vision of politics than now endures and that the principle has been so erode by time as to be virtually unrecognisable if then it existed in the first place.Part 1 Crichel Down affairAs Bradley & Ewing chief out the Crichel Down Affair of 1937 is the acknowledged starting point in any discussion of ministerial responsibility9. Farmland in Dorset, which was called Crichel Down, was acquired under compulsory purchase powers10 by the Air Ministry in 1938 prior to the bang of war for a new bombing range11. Lieutenant Commander marten asked that the land be sold back to his family (who had previously owned most of the land) save what followed was, in the opinion of the subsequent inquiry setup to investigate the affair, muddle, inefficiency, bias and bad faith on the part of some officials named in the report12. In particular an inaccurate report was drafted by a junior courtly servant that led to the Ministry of Agriculture adopting a connive which deprived the former owners of rights in the land or as Wass succinctly puts it, bona fide applicants for the land had not been devoted up the opportunity they had been promised to bid for a rental or for possession of the land13. Wass highlight s the two senior well-bred servants determine by the inquiry who did attempt to cover their own tracks once the facts were discernibleThe one mistake on which everyone seized was the impropriety of the two principal officials who, realising that applicants to rent or buy the land had not been given the opportunities they had been led to expect, sought to be retrospectively to have considered their case. This was manifestly wrong and would have been a fitted subject for a mild criticism by the Ombudsman, if he had existed at the time and had the case been referred to him. But it is pretty clear from the papers that, flush if the applicants cases had been considered, the outcome, viz. a decision to continue to farm the unit as a single unit by a farmer of turn out ability, would have been the same.14The end result was that the Minister of Agriculture, Sir Thomas Dugdale, resigned and the two civil servants were moved to other duties15. The constitutional legacy of Crichel Down was that it is now cited as the last example of a ministers letance of responsibility for all the acts of his department16. In the subsequent debate in the base of leafy vegetable Sir David Maxwells Fyfe, the then Home Secretary, sought to crystalise four situations in which a Minister must vicariously accept responsibility to varying degrees for the actions or inactions of his civil servants ranging from where an explicit order is given to where action is taken by a civil servant of which the Minister disapproves and has no previous knowledge17. This continuum of responsibility did not contain any mention of resignation and the topic remains wedded to circumstances at that place is no duty on a minister to resign when maladministration has occurred deep down his or her department18. The key factors which influence a resignation are for the most part political a fact which is corroborated by Professor Finer19 and Bradley & Ewings seminal work on constitutional law20.Part 2 Arm s to IraqBy the convention supposedly crystallised in the viewing of the Crichel Down affair the Ministers liable for exporting arms to Iraq would have had to have resigned in the wake of the Scott Report into the affair in 199621. Ultimately there were no resignations despite a close vote in the Commons during the debate on the report. The conclusions of the report were, however, devastating in finding that there were numerous failings by ministers to keep fan tan appraised of their arms exporting constitution and, fundamentally, they had misled Parliament, albeit not intentionally22. Instead the ministers involved managed to slip into what Margaret Liu has called an accountability gap which exploits the definitions given to responsibility and accountability respectively23. As Liu explainsA minister is responsible to Parliament for what had occurred in his department without that implying personal blame on the part of a minister if things had gone wrong. By contrast, a minis ter is said to be responsible for broad policy, and the issues that he/she has been personally involved, not for all department affairs. In other words, the minister is not responsible for what is done by the civil service in the Next Steps agency where he has delegated the accountability for administration from parent departments.24This relatively new artificial bankers bill allows ministers to escape responsibility for actions in their department carried out by civil servants and in the long run leads, as Liu rightly observes, to potential areas of government for which no one is responsible to Parliament, even though a minister remains accountable25. Thus despite all of the furore created by the report the ministers were ultimately able to hang onto their jobs and there was to be no supreme pass on a la Sir Thomas Dugdale in the Crichel Down affair. This distinction appears to have fuelled the practice of misleading Parliament and being creative with the truth to rid of liabil ity in respect of departmental maladministration. As Liu points out individual ministerial responsibility essentially involves the private get by of a minister, the ministers conduct of his/her department and vicarious acts of civil servants26. Personal conduct seems to be the exception with many ministers resigning because it was impossible to conduct their duties in the media glare27 but as Bradley & Ewing note there have been very few resignations by ministers taking vicarious responsibility for the errors of civil servants in their departments28. The level of culpableness was high in the Arms to Iraq case and the fact that no minister lost their jobs is reflective of modern political times where no minister resigns unless the matter is exceptionally serious or private conduct is preventing them doing their jobs. As Longley & Lewis concludeIf the minister is indeed responsible for systems, then he is responsible for their mishap either directly or through the identification of those who are. If this is not the case, then plainly ministerial responsibility is a myth. Slowly the authorisation of the convention has been erodedScott may have been successfully defused in the party-political arena, but if his report is left to gather dust when it is an indictment of the deep-seated failure of parliamentary government, then the fabled British system will be all the disapprobation which it is bound to receive.29ConclusionIn conclusion Herbert Morrisons contestation was inaccurate even back in the political climate in which it was created a time when a minister would supposedly dec for the actions of any civil servant and would do the right thing by standing down30. As Professor Finer justifiably notes, the cases which precede the Crichel Down affair do not even lend substance to the convention and the principle in fact relies upon factors such as the mood of the set up Minister and the will of the minister concerned rather than an overriding find of accept ing responsibility for the actions of others31. Applied to the modern political climate the statement is wildly inaccurate with various commentators rightly alleging that it is a myth in the British constitution32. The Scott Report demonstrates the pliability of the principle well and the artificial distinctions amid responsibility and accountability, inextricably linked, serve only to further burden the principle to the dustbin of history save in the most serious of cases. Now creativity is used in giving answers to Parliament and all responsibility is to be evaded until the eleventh hour. This is, as noted in the introduction, a reflection of the growth of the apparatus of the state and the unelected power of ministers. Professor Finers four categories are more realistic even in 2012There are four categories of delinquent Ministers the fortunate, the less fortunate, the unfortunate, and the plain unlucky. aft(prenominal) sinning, the first go to other Ministries the second to Another Place the troika just go. Of the fourth there are but twenty examples in a century33Bibliography JournalsFiner, E.S. (1956) The Individual Responsibility of Ministers universe Administration 377Liu, Margaret L (2002) Ministerial Responsibility and Constitutional Law Coventry Law 7(2) pp25-37 at p.29Longley, D & Lewis, Norman (1996) Ministerial Responsibility The Next Steps Public Law nightfall pp490-507Wass, Douglas (1988) The Mystery of Crichel Down Public Law Autumn pp473 475BooksBradey, AW & Ewing, KD (2007) Constitutional & Administrative Law Pearson worldwideTomkins, Adam (1998) The Constitution later on Scott Government Unwrapped Oxford University Press OxfordTurpin, Colin (1994) Ministerial Responsibility Myth or Reality? in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.), The Changing Constitution, (3rd ed), pp. 114-115